# 1NC

### Off 1

#### 1 Interpretation: The ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option.

#### 2 Violation:

#### A “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School, ‘4

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

**The colon introduces** the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. **A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"¶ Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.**

#### B USFG is the national government in DC.

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3 Vote Negative:

#### Limits on what can be debated protect subversion and meaningful debate.

Shively, 2K

(Former Assistant Politics Professor – Texas A&M, Partisan Politics and Political Theory, pp. 181-4, We have the full text of the card if you want to see it)

At the very least, **we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it.** For instance, once cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one’s target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, **contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements.** The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator’s audience must know what is being resisted. In short, **the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it.** In other words, **contestation rests on some basic agreements or harmony.**¶Continues on page 184¶ But, again, the response to the ambiguist must be that **the practice of questioning and undermining rules**, like all other social practices, **needs a certain order. The subversive needs rules to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective of subversion, we find that they are roughly the rules of argument** discussed above. In fact, **the rules of argument are roughly the rules of democracy or civility: the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action from violence, manipulation, and other forms of tyranny.**

#### And, fair division of ground is necessary for meaningful switch-side debate – switch-side debating cultivates a civic attitude which threatens fundamentalism and turns debate into a training ground for progressive politics

Mitchell et al. 07

(Gordon, Eric English, Stephen Llano, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief, and Carly Woods, Pitt Comm Studies Grad Students, Gordon Mitchell is an Associate Comm Studies Professor @ Pitt, Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies 4)

The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence. It is our position, however, that **rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes.** **Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry**. For example, Georgetown University law professor **Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff ’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions**. 12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. **The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles**. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 **The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change**. Moreover**, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies**. **For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism**. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\***the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’**

#### Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid **a voice of authority,** however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of **academic educators**, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as **fighting oppression** that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and **overbearing,** and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For **the skills of** fighting or **refuting an oppressive power are not** those of **openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue**. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading **Hitler’s** Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was **precisely** that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, **the Gulag,** and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – **unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue**, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, **in an ongoing spiral of intolerance**.

**Decisionmaking is the most portable skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy**

**Steinberg**, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, **‘8**

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of **intense debate**, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps **equally difficult** for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. **Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made**. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. **Life demands decision making**. We make **countless individual decisions** every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. **Every profession** requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through **military invasion or diplomacy**? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? **And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others**. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. **We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?**

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

**Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us**. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

### Off2

#### THE WORKING CLASS MUST COALESCE IN MATERIAL ACTION AGAINST FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION ESPECIALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF ENERGY PLANNING. THE AFF’S NOTION OF AGENCY UNIQUELY UNDERMINES THE MATERIALIST ANTI-CAPITALIST REVOLUTIONARY KNOWLEDGE KEY TO SURVIVAL.

Callinicos 2k10

[Alex, Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crisis of the Liberal World, Polity, professor of European studies King’s College – London, DPhil – Oxford, p. 139-43]

There are other strong reasons to press for a break with the logic of competitive accumulation. The scientific evi-dence that the emission of greenhouse gases - most notably C02 - caused by human activity is generating profound and irreversible processes of climate change is now beyond dispute. It is also very widely agreed that preventing these processes reaching a disastrous scale requires the rapid adoption and implementation of drastic targets for cutting CO2 emissions. But while the targets, particularly since the eclipse of the Bush gang, have become more ambitious, the actual emissions have continued to rise. The most plausible explanation appeals to the logic of competition.

The problem is, yet again, one of collective action. Evi- dently it is in everyone's interest to avoid drastic climate change. But no individual capital or state is willing to shoulder the additional costs involved in moving to a low- carbon economy. In international negotiations, the leading states play a game of pass-the-parcel - the US demanding that India and China adopt tough targets, the latter asking why they should bear the burden of two centuries of industrialization mainly in the North. The EU, despite its pre- tensions to be a master of 'soft power' that has transcended bad old nationalism, is particularly ineffectual. Germany has vocally and largely successfully defended its car firms against what they regarded as excessively tough targets. And the economic crisis has provided many governments with a perfect excuse to go slow in reducing reliance on fossil fuels. The logic of competitive accumulation here threatens the future of the human species.20 The implication is that any sustainable alternative to •capitalism has to be based, not on the market, but on democratic planning. In a democratically planned economy the allocation of resources would be the outcome of a democratic political process that would set overall priori- ties for the economy. There are some models of how this could work. One is Albert's Parecon, or participatory economics. This involves an economy of workers' and consumers' councils in which individuals and enterprises submit proposals for their share of society's resources and a process of gradual adjustments (Albert calls them 'iterations') takes place while technical experts come up with a plan that would give everyone as much as possible of what they want. The main weakness of this model is that it mimics a bit too closely the workings of a market economy, in which claims on resources are driven by individual demands. Albert is an anarchist, and his commitment to decentralization here goes too far. The allocation of society's resources isn't a neutral technical issue. It's a political question that requires some sort of collective and democratic decision-making process to choose between what would often be competing views of the priorities of the society in question. From this perspective, Pat Devine offers a superior model of what he calls negotiated coordination. Here the allocation of resources is largely the outcome of discussion between producers, consumers and other affected groups, but within the framework of overall decisions about economic priorities made democratically at the national and international level.21 Plainly there is much more to be said - and, above all, to be done - about democratic planning. All the same, the importance of the kind of work being done by Albert Devine and others is that they begin to break down the prejudice against planning and to sketch out how an economy that rejected the market could manage to be both democratic and efficient. But any break with capitalism couldn't take the form of an instantaneous leap into a fully planned economy. Marx long ago argued in the 'Critique of the Gotha Programme' that a new workers' state would inherit a society deeply marked by capitalism. Initially, it would have to make compromises with the old order, and gradually move towards a society governed by the communist principle 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!'22 Similarly today a government breaking with capitalism would need to make a decisive shift towards an economy in which priorities were decided democratically rather than left to the anarchy of competition. This would involve critically taking control of the financial markets, nationalizing under workers' control key sectors of the economy, and extending social provision on the basis of a progressive tax system that redistributed wealth and income from rich to poor. These measures, radical though they are, would still leave in place many aspects of a market economy. Large sectors would remain in private hands. Continuous pressure and the introduction of new mea- sures would be necessary to move the economy as a whole towards the principles of democratic planning. One key step would be to weaken the power of the capitalist labour market, which today rules our lives. In my view, the best way to do this would be to intro- duce universal direct income. In other words, every resi- dent of the country would receive, as of right, an income that met their basic needs at a relatively low but neverthe- less decent level. This would serve two goals. First, it would ensure a basic level of welfare for everyone much more efficiently than existing systems of social provision. (People with greater needs because they had children or were disabled or whatever would receive a higher basic income.) Secondly, having a guaranteed basic income would greatly reduce the pressure on individuals to accept whatever job was on offer on the labour market. One of the main presuppositions of capitalism - that workers have no acceptable alternative to wage labour - would be removed. The balance of power between labour and capital would shift towards the workers, irrespective of the nature of their employer.23 More broadly, the question of power is crucial. One obvious challenge to the kind of vision of change I have just sketched out is how to ensure that the direction of change would be towards a democratically planned economy rather than back to market capitalism or maybe to the kind of state capitalism that ended up dominating the Soviet Union. The only guarantee that counts is that levers of political power are in the hands of the workers and the poor themselves. As long as the state takes the form that it does today, of a bureaucratically organized, hierarchical set of apparatuses whose managers' interests are bound up with those of capital, any improvement in society can only be temporary and fragile. This is why the strategy of ignoring the state advocated by Holloway is so badly mistaken. If we are to move towards a democratically planned economy, then the existing state has to be confronted and broken. This task can only be achieved through the development of a different kind of power, one based on the self- organization of workers and other poor people that devel- ops out of their struggles against capital. The great revolutionary movements of the twentieth century offered some glimpses of this power - from the workers' and sol- diers' councils of the Russian Revolution of October 1917 to the workers' shoras during the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9. The self-organization displayed by the Bolivian popular movement during the insurrections of October 2003 and May-June 2005 showed that the contemporary movements against neoliberalism can generate this kind of power as well.24 A democratically planned economy would be the core of a self-managing society, one in which directly elected workplace and neighbourhood councils took responsibil- ity for their own affairs and linked together to make deci- sions for society at large. The key insight that Marx had during the Paris Commune of 1871 was that these forms of organization would develop before the new society was created, in the process of fighting the old society. The same methods of self-organization that would be the basis of a self-managing society are needed by the exploited and oppressed to resist and, ultimately, to overthrow capital itself. The overthrow of capital is itself a process. The dilemma that Albert imagines confronting a workers' cooperative in a market economy would face any society that was beginning to introduce the principles of democratic plan- ning in a world still ruled by capitalism. It was responsible for the corruption and eventual destruction of the Russian Revolution of October 1917. Any breakthrough in one part of the world could only survive by spreading and progressively overturning the logic of capital on a global scale. The globalization of capital has produced a global- ization of resistance. Struggles in different parts of the world contaminate each other. Chiapas and Seattle had global reverberations. The two European countries with the most advanced and combative social movements, France and Greece, have exerted a degree of mutual influ- ence on one another. The movements in Latin America have become a beacon to all those fighting neoliberalism. "We are still a very long way from overturning capitalism even in one country. Indeed, the more one seeks to elabo- rate on the shape of an alternative to capitalism the more one is overawed by the immensity of the task. The biggest immediate obstacle that confronts anyone seeking to address it is the chronic political weakness of the radical anticapitalist left on a global scale. Nevertheless, the present crisis has torn a huge hole in neoliberalism both as an ideology and as a mode of organizing capital- ism. The market no longer seems like a second nature unamenable to change or control. Those who are prepared to seize this moment boldly can help to ensure that the boundaries of the possible really are widened, allowing the billions of victims of capitalism finally to escape.

#### Text: VOTE NEGATIVE TO REJECT THE 1AC IN FAVOR OF MATERIALIST REVOLUTIONARY KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AGAINST CAPITALISM.

#### AND, ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHE NECESSITATES MATERIALIST REVOLUTIONARY DIALECTICS AGAINST CAPITALISM’S EXPLOITATION TO ENSURE SURVIVAL.

Foster 2k11

[john bellamy,  professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and also editor of Monthly Review, Since the Great Financial Crisis hit in 2008, Foster has been sought out by academics, activists, the media, and the general public as a result of his earlier prescient writings on the coming crisis. He has given numerous interviews, talks, and invited lectures, as well as written invited commentary, articles, and books on the subject]

In the twenty-first century it is customary to view the rise of planetary ecological problems as a surprising development scarcely conceivable prior to the last few decades. It is here, however, that we have the most to learn from the analysis of nineteenth-century thinkers who played a role in the development of ecology, including both early ecological scientists and classical historical materialists. Science has long warned of the negative, destructive side of the human transformation of the earth—a warning which the system, driven by its own imperatives, has continually sought to downplay. Indeed, what distinguishes our time from earlier centuries is not so much the conservation of catastrophe, which has long been recognized, but rather the accelerated pace at which such destruction is now manifesting itself, i.e., what I am calling the accumulation of catastrophe. The desertification arising in pre-capitalist times, partly through human action, manifested itself over centuries, even millennia. Today changes in the land, the atmosphere, the oceans, indeed the entire life-support system of the earth, are the product of mere decades. If in the past, Darwin was struck that in a mere three centuries after European colonization, the ecology of the island of St. Helena had been destroyed to the point that it was reduced to “desert”—today, in only two generations, we have altered the biogeochemical processes of the entire planet.28The absence of a historical perspective on the conservation, even accumulation, of catastrophe is a major barrier to needed change in our time. Many environmentalists, including some who perceive themselves as being on the left, persist in believing that we can address our immense and growing ecological problems without altering our fundamental social-production relationships. All that is necessary in this view is the combined magic of green technology and green markets. Short-term fixes are presumed to be adequate solutions, while society remains on the same essential course as before. Indeed, the dominant perspective on ecology can be characterized, I believe, as consisting of three successive stages of denial: (1) the denial altogether of the planetary ecological crisis (or its human cause); (2) the denial that the ecological crisis is fundamentally due to the system of production in which we live, namely capitalism; and (3) the denial that capitalism is constitutionally incapable of overcoming this global ecological threat—with capital now being presented instead as the savior of the environment.The first stage of ecological denial is easy to understand. This is the form of denial represented by Exxon-Mobil. Such outright denial of the destructive consequences of their actions is the automatic response of corporations generally when faced with the prospect of environmental regulations, which would negatively affect their bottom lines. It is also the form of absolute denial promoted by climate-change denialists themselves, who categorically reject the reality of human agency in global climate change. The second stage of denial, a retreat from the first, is to admit there is a problem,while dissociating it from the larger socioeconomic system. The famous IPAT formula, i.e. Environmental Impact = Population x Consumption x Technology (which amounts to saying that these are the three factors behind our environmental problems/solutions), has been used by some to suggest that population growth, the consumption habits of most individuals, and inappropriate technology carry the totality of blame for environmental degradation. The answer then is sustainable population, sustainable consumption, and sustainable technology. This approach, though seemingly matter-of-fact, and deceptively radical, derives its acceptability for the vested interests from the fact that it generally serves to disguise the more fundamental reality of the treadmill of capitalist production itself.29 The third stage of denial, a last-ditch defense, and exhibiting a greater level of desperation on the part of the established order, is, I would argue, the most dangerous of all. It admits that the environmental crisis is wrapped up with the existence of capitalism, but argues that what we need is an entirely new kind of capitalism: variously called “sustainable capitalism,” “green capitalism,” “natural capitalism,” and “climate capitalism” by thinkers as various as Al Gore, Paul Hawken, Amory and L. Hunter Lovins, and Jonathon Porritt.30 The argument here varies but usually begins with the old trope that capitalism is the most efficient economic system possible—a form of “spontaneous order” arising from an invisible hand—and that the answer to ecological problems is to make it more efficient still by internalizing costs on the environment previously externalized by the system. Aside from the presumed magic of the market itself, and moral claims as to “the greening of corporations,” this is supposed to be achieved by means of a black box of technological wonders. Implicit in all such views is the notion that capitalism can be made sustainable, without altering its accumulation or economic growth imperative and without breaking with the dominant social relations. The exponential growth of the system ad infinitum is possible, we are told, while simultaneously generating a sustainable relation to the planet. This of course runs up against what Herman Daly has called the Impossibility Theorem: If the whole world were to have an ecological footprint the size of the United States we would need multiple planets.31 The idea that such a development process can persist permanently on a single planet (and indeed that we are not at this point already confronting earthly limits) is of course an exercise in delusion, bordering on belief in the supernatural. “Capitalism,” as the great environmental economist K. William Kapp once wrote, is “an economy of unpaid costs.”32 It can persist and even prosper only insofar as it is able to externalize its costs on the mass of the population and the surrounding environment. Whenever the destruction is too severe the system simply seeks to engineer another spatial fix. Yet, a planetary capitalism is from this standpoint a contradiction in terms: it means that there is nowhere finally to externalize the social and environmental costs of capitalist destruction (we cannot ship our toxic waste into outer space!), and no external resources to draw upon in the face of the enormous squandering of resources inherent to the system (we can’t solve our problems by mining the moon!).Market-based solutions to climate change, such as emissions trading, have been shown to promote profits, and to facilitate economic growth and financial wealth, while increasing carbon emissions. From an environmental standpoint, therefore, they are worse than nothing—since they stand in the way of effective action. Nor are the technologies most acceptable to the system (since not requiring changes in property relations) the answer. So-called “clean coal” or carbon capture and storage technologies are economically unfeasible and ecologically dubious, and serve mainly as an ideological justification for keeping coal-fired plants going. Worse still, are geoengineering schemes like dumping sulfur particles in the atmosphere or iron filings in the ocean (the first in order to deflect the sun’s rays, the second in order to promote algal growth to increase ocean absorption of carbon). These schemes carry with them the potential for even greater ecological disasters: in the first case, this could lead to a reduction of photosynthesis, in the second the expansion of dead zones. Remember the Sorcerer’s Apprentice!33 The potential for the accumulation of catastrophe on a truly planetary level as a result of geoengineering technology is so great that it would be absolute folly to proceed in this way—simply in order to avoid changes in the mode of production, i.e., a fundamental transformation of our way of life, property relations, and metabolism with nature. Science tells us that we are crossing planetary boundaries everywhere we look, from climate change, to ocean acidification, to species destruction, to freshwater shortages, to chemical pollution of air, water, soil, and humans. The latest warning sign is the advent of what is called “extreme weather”—a direct outgrowth of climate change. As Hansen says: “Global warming increases the intensity of droughts and heat waves, and thus the area of forest fires. However, because a warmer atmosphere holds more water vapor, global warming must also increase the intensity of the other extreme of the hydrologic cycle—meaning heavier rains, more extreme floods, and more intense storms driven by latent heat.” Scientists involved in the new area of climate-attribution science, where extreme weather events are examined for their climate signatures, are now arguing that we are rapidly approaching a situation where the proverbial “‘hundred-year’ flood” no longer occurs simply once a century, but every few years. Natural catastrophes are thus likely to become more severe and more frequent occurrences in the lives of all living beings. The hope of some scientists is that this will finally wake up humanity to its true danger.34 How are we to understand the challenge of the enormous accumulation of catastrophe, and the no less massive human action required to address this? In the 1930s John Maynard Keynes wrote an essay entitled “Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren,” aimed at defending capitalism in response to revolutionary social challenges then arising. Keynes argued that we should rely for at least a couple more generations on the convenient lie of the Smithian invisible hand—accepting greed as the basis of a spontaneous economic order. We should therefore continue the pretense that “fair is foul and foul is fair” for the sake of the greater accumulation of wealth in society that such an approach would bring. Eventually, in the time of our “grandchildren”—maybe a “hundred years” hence (i.e., by the early 2030s)—Keynes assumed, the added wealth created by these means would be great enough that we could begin to tell the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. It would then be necessary for humanity to address the enormous inequalities and injustices produced by the system, engaging in a full-scale redistribution of wealth, and a radical transformation of the ends of production.35 Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is fairer—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

### Off 3

**THE 1AC IGNORES THAT RACISM IS MERELY ONE AMONGST MANY TOOLS OF AXIOLOGICAL ANTHROPOCENTRISM WHEREBY VIOLENCE CAN ALWAYS BE JUSTIFIED WHEN APPLIED TO RACIALLY INFERIOR GROUPS. ONLY A CRITIQUE WHICH FOCUSES ON REJECTING SUBHUMAN THINKING CAN CONTEST THE MYRIAD FORMS OF RACISM.**

**Deckha 2k10**

[Maneesha, faculty of law, university of Victoria, “it’s time to abandon the idea of human rights”, the scavenger, dec. 10]

While the intersection of race and gender is often acknowledged in understanding the etiology of justificatory narratives for war, the presence of species distinctions and the importance of the subhuman are less appreciated. Yet, the race (and gender) thinking that animates Razack’s argument in normalizing violence for detainees (and others) is also centrally sustained by the subhuman figure. As Charles Patterson notes with respect to multiple forms of exploitation: **Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species, our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animas and do the same to th**em. Patterson emphasizes how **the human/animal hierarchy and our ideas about animals and animality are foundational for intra-human hierarchies and the violence they promote. The routine violence against beings designated subhuman serves as both a justification and blueprint for violence against humans**. For example, in discussing the specific dynamics of the Nazi camps, Patterson further notes how techniques to make the killing of detainees resemble the slaughter of animals were deliberately implemented in order to make the killing seem more palatable and benign. That the detainees were made naked and kept crowded in the gas chambers facilitated their animalization and, in turn, their death at the hands of other humans who were already culturally familiar and comfortable with killing animals in this way. Returning to Razack’s exposition of race thinking in contemporary camps, one can see how **subhuman thinking is foundational to race thinking**. One of her primary arguments is that race thinking, which she defines as **“the denial of a common bond of humanity between people of European descent and those who are not”, is “a defining feature of the world order” today as in the past**. In other words, **it is the “species thinking” that helps to create the racial demarcation. As Razack notes with respect to the specific logic infusing the camps, they “are not simply contemporary excesses born of the west’s current quest for security, but instead represent a more ominous, permanent arrangement of who is and is not a part of the human community”. Once placed outside the “human” zone by race thinking, the detainees may be handled lawlessly and thus with violence that is legitimated at all times. Racialization is not enough and does not complete their Othering experience. Rather, they must be dehumanized for the larger public to accept the violence against them and the increasing “culture of exception” which sustains these human bodily exclusions**. Although nonhumans are not the focus of Razack’s work, the centrality of the subhuman **to the logic of the camps and racial and sexual violence contained therein is also clearly illustrated in her specific example**s. In the course of her analysis, to determine the import of race thinking in enabling violence, Razack quotes a newspaper story that describes the background mentality of Private Lynndie England, the white female soldier made notorious by images of her holding onto imprisoned and naked Iraqi men with a leash around their necks. The story itself quotes a resident from England’s hometown who says the following about the sensibilities of individuals from their town: To the country boys here, if you’re a different nationality, a different race, you’re sub-human. That’s the way that girls like Lynndie England are raised. Tormenting Iraqis, in her mind, would be no different from shooting a turkey. Every season here you’re hunting something. Over there they’re hunting Iraqis. Razack extracts this quote to illustrate how “race overdetermined what went on”, but it may also be observed that species “overdetermined what went on”. **Race has a formative function, to be sure, but it works in conjunction with species difference to enable the violence at Abu Ghraib and other camps. Dehumanization promotes racialization, which further entrenches both identities. It is an intertwined logic of race, sex, culture and species that lays the foundation for the violence**.

**AND, this species-contingent paradigm creates unending genocidal violence against forms of life deemed politically unqualified.**

**KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8**

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

**Within the picture** many paint **of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an** exception, an **aberration.** The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However**, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history**. Hence, **if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritag**e. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. **It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism**, in its various guises, **points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land** (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, **the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought** (Foucault, 2003). **This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity**. After all, all too often **the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and** in some instances that they were **closer to ‘apes’ than to humans** (Diamond, 2006**). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans.** **Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed** in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that **whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka”** (Singer, 1968, p.750).

**Alternative: the judge should vote negative to REJECT THE HUMAN/ANIMAL DIVIDE.**

**this rejection enables an understanding of the SPECIES-BEING. that SOLVES THE ETHICAL CONTRADICTION OF THEIR SPECIES-LEVEL RACISM.**

**HUDSON 2K4**

[Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

**We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction** that fails to fully describe what we are, **we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance** across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, **the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity”**

**through which we have learned to make sense of our world**. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. **A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature.** But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. **The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable**. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, **we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?**

**And, anthropocentric discourse and tropes cause racial criminalization and stigma faster than it can be recognized. THAT MEANS OUR INTERNAL LINK IS TRIGGERED AT A LEVEL WHICH YOUR SOLVENCY MECHANISM HAS NO RISK OF CAPUTRING BY CONTRAST TO OUR ALT WHICH SOLVES A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF RACISM.**

**Stanford University 2k8**

[February 7). Discrimination Against Blacks Linked To Dehumanization, Study Finds. ScienceDaily. Retrieved January 25, 2012, from http://www.sciencedaily.com­/releases/2008/02/080207163811.htm]

ScienceDaily (Feb. 7, 2008) — Crude historical depictions of African Americans as ape-like may have disappeared from mainstream U.S. culture, but research presented in a new paper by psychologists at Stanford, Pennsylvania State University and the University of California-Berkeley reveals that many Americans subconsciously associate blacks with apes. In addition, the findings show that **society is more likely to condone violence against black criminal suspects as a result of its broader inability to accept African Americans as fully human,** **according to** the researchers. Co-author Jennifer Eberhardt, a Stanford associate professor of psychology who is black, said she was shocked by the results, particularly since they involved subjects born after Jim Crow and the civil rights movement. "This was actually some of the most depressing work I have done," she said. "This shook me up. You have suspicions when you do the work—intuitions—you have a hunch. But it was hard to prepare for how strong [the black-ape association] was—how we were able to pick it up every time." The paper, "Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization and Contemporary Consequences," is the result of **a series of six previously unpublished studies** conducted by Eberhardt, Pennsylvania State University psychologist Phillip Atiba Goff (the lead author and a former student of Eberhardt's) and Matthew C. Jackson and Melissa J. Williams, graduate students at Penn State and Berkeley, respectively. The paper is scheduled to appear Feb. 7 in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, which is published by the American Psychological Association. The research took place over six years at Stanford and Penn State under Eberhardt's supervision. It involved mostly white male undergraduates. In a series of studies that subliminally flashed black or white male faces on a screen for a fraction of a second to "prime" the students, r**esearchers found subjects could identify blurry ape drawings much faster after they were primed with black faces than with white faces.** The researchers consistently discovered a black-ape association even if the young adults said they knew nothing about its historical connotations. The connection was made only with African American faces; the paper's third study failed to find an ape association with other non-white groups, such as Asians. Despite such race-specific findings, the researchers stressed that dehumanization and **animal imagery**

**have been used for centuries to justify violence against many oppressed groups.** "**Despite** widespread **opposition to racism, bias remains with us,"** Eberhardt said. **"African Americans are still** dehumanized; we're still **associated with apes** in this country. **That association can lead people to endorse the beating of black suspects by police officers**, and I think it has lots of other consequences that we have yet to uncover." Historical background Scientific racism in the United States was graphically promoted in a mid-19th-century book by Josiah C. Nott and George Robins Gliddon titled Types of Mankind, which used misleading illustrations to suggest that "Negroes" ranked between "Greeks" and chimpanzees. "When we have a history like that in this country, I don't know how much of that goes away completely, especially to the extent that we are still dealing with severe racial inequality, which fuels and maintains those associations in ways that people are unaware," Eberhardt said.

Although such grotesque characterizations of African Americans have largely disappeared from mainstream U.S. society, Eberhardt noted that science education could be partly responsible for reinforcing the view that blacks are less evolved than whites. An iconic 1970 illustration, "March of Progress," published in the Time-Life book Early Man, depicts evolution beginning with a chimpanzee and ending with a white man. "It's a legacy of our past that the endpoint of evolution is a white man," Eberhardt said. "I don't think it's intentional, but **when people learn about human evolution, they walk away with a notion that people of African descent are closer to apes than people of European descent. When people think of a civilized person, a white man comes to mind."** Consequences of socially endorsed violence In the paper's fifth study, the researchers subliminally primed 115 white male undergraduates with words associated with either apes (such as "monkey," "chimp," "gorilla") or big cats (such as "lion," "tiger," "panther"). The latter was used as a control because both images are associated with violence and Africa, Eberhardt said. The subjects then watched a two-minute video clip, similar to the television program COPS, depicting several police officers violently beating a man of undetermined race. A mugshot of either a white or a black man was shown at the beginning of the clip to indicate who was being beaten, with a description conveying that, although described by his family as "a loving husband and father," the suspect had a serious criminal record and may have been high on drugs at the time of his arrest. The students were then asked to rate how justified the beating was. Participants who believed the suspect was white were no more likely to condone the beating when they were primed with either ape or big cat words, Eberhardt said. But t**hose who thought the suspect was black were more likely to justify the beating if they had been primed with ape words** than with big cat words. "Taken together, t**his suggests that implicit knowledge of a Black-ape association led to marked differences in participants' judgments of Black criminal suspects**," the researchers write. According to the paper's authors, this link has devastating consequences for African Americans because it "alters visual perception and attention, and it increases endorsement of violence against black suspects." For example, the paper's sixth study showed that in hundreds of news stories from 1979 to 1999 in the Philadelphia Inquirer, **African Americans** convicted of capital crimes **were** about f**our times more likely than whites convicted of capital crimes to be described with ape-relevant language, such as "barbaric," "beast," "brute," "savage" and "wild." "Those** who are implicitly **portrayed** as more **ape-like** in these articles **are more likely to be executed by the state than those who are not,**" the researchers write.

# 2NC

### A2: We Provide Some Limits

#### RULES of DIALOGUE are key – bad T interpretations make the dialogue TERRIBLE even if it’s TECHNICALLY a dialogue

Bostad 4

<http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/140391690X%20-%20-%20Bakhtinian%20Perspectives%20on%20Language%20and%20Culture~%20Meaning%20in%20Language,%20Art%20and%20New%20.pdf>¶ Finn Bostad is Associate Professor of Applied Linguistics at The Norwegian¶ University of Science and Technology in the field of human communication¶ and new technology. He has run and worked on national and university¶ projects on meaning-making in Internet environments, published¶ internationally on electronic discourse, and supervised a research programme¶ on ICT and learning at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. He is currently researching multimedia semiotics

Very often a dialogue exists only if the persons involved in the communication act observe and **respect some rules** of dialogism, and some of these main ‘rules’ or principles may be a mutual trust or reciprocity (Rommetveit 1992), a sharing of power and comprehension that gives everybody an equal opportunity to have his or her voice heard. In addition there must be a conscious effort on the part of the participants to **achieve something together** and actively participate in the process of negotiating meaning that a dialogue is. Negotiated meaning, or understanding, grows out of the response as ‘[u]nderstanding and response are dialectically merged and mutually condition each other; one is impossible without the other’ (Bakhtin 1981: 282). It is possible to generate a long catalogue of such principles, which Linell does in his work (Linell 1998). There is also a **wide range** of dialogical varieties from, at the one end, a **top-down monologue where one party dominates communication** and leaves no room for sharing and participation, to, at the other end, a communicative event where power and dominance is more or less equally shared between the participants. In this near ideal situation there is no real centre of power, but a sharing of it.

#### T CRITQUES ARE INTRINSCIALLY MONOLOGUES – only a topical STASIS point solves

Lillis 3

Student Writing as 'Academic Literacies': Drawing on Bakhtin to Move from Critique to Design

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<http://www.writing.ucsb.edu/wrconf08/Pdf_Articles/Lillis_Article2.pdf>

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Academic Literacies as Design: From **Monologism to Dialogism** 'Academic literacies' has proved to be highly generative as a critical research frame, but as a design frame it has yet to be developed. I am using'design' here in the broad sense of the application of research generated understandings to pedagogy. I will outline how this broad sense of design connects with Kress's particu- lar notion of design in relation to critique below. The point 1 want to make here is simply that, to date, little explicit attention has been paid to exploring how an academic literacies stance might inform the theory and practice of student writing pedagogy. Perhaps the nearest example vet of what might be considered a design response to academic literacies critique can be found in the notion and practice of critical language awareness (CLA), coined by Clark et al. (1990) and developed in the work of higher education teacher-researchers in the UK and by others in different parts of the world, notably in South Africa (for UK develop- ments see Clark, 1992; Clark & Ivanic, 1997; Wallace, 1999; for South Africa, see Janks, 1999;Thesen, 1997; for Singapore, see Kramer-Dahl, 2001 ). This pedagogi- cal approach, drawing explicitly on critical discourse analysis, involves consciousness-raising amongst learners about power and ideology in relation to language use (for recent overview see Clark & I vanic, 1999). Academic literacies researchers share many of the same preoccupations as CLA researcher/ers, often share similar intellectual roots and, indeed, in some cases are the same people. But, apart from the small amount of CLA work which tends to hover at the margins of the academy, particularly within the UK context (within specifically designated language/literacy areas of the curriculum such as writing support, critical language awareness courses, English for Academic Purposes (EAP) courses) there has been little to suggest how we might enact understandings generated from an academic literacies' stance within disciplinary areas of the curriculum in higher education more broadly. In any case, and of more fundamental concern to me in this paper is CLA the design we should be looking towards? I am increasingly coming to see that CLA tends to share one of the major limitations of more conventional writing peda- gogy within higher education. By this 1 mean, briefly - and I speak as someone interested in and who has drawn on CLA work-that **meaning making continues to be construed as monologic**, with an emphasis on a single, unified version of truth. This is evident in terms of CLA's own theoretical and pedagogical framing: • Theoretical framing: CLA tends to work from within a dialectic approach to meaning making. By 'dialectic' here I'm referring to traditions of reasoning informing CLA work which emphasise the following: (a) synthesis as the goal of meaning making, and (b) **a version of dialectic governed by binary framings** where one version of truth is privileged over others. I return to both of these dimensions below, but for the moment here wish to point to CLA's emphasis on binaries. Consider such 'either/or' framings in accounts of CLA -such as dominant/dominated (groups), **oppressive/non-oppres- sive** (practices), dominant/oppositional (practices, forces),**existing/alterna- tive (conventions).** These binary framings have continued to inform much work in CLA, including mv own (see e.g. Clark & Ivanic, 1999; Clark et al 1990, 1991; Lillis, 1997). • Pedagogical framing: CLA tends to assume that an (already critical) expert is engaged in raising awareness of an (as yet uncritical) student about language, power and ideology. In this sense, there is a danger that CLA pedagogy, like more conventional pedagogy, privileges only the tutor/ insti- tution's perspectives and denies students' contributions to, and struggles around, meaning making. Consider, for example, Gark and Ivanic's (1999: 67) aims as stated in a recent editorial introduction to CLA where the 'we' and 'they' is clearly signalled: 'We aim to help students become more aware of the complex relationship between the institution, discourse, social power relations, identities and agency in shaping these practices'. Within this fram- ing, it is the tutor who still holds the main responsibility for posing the prob- lem to which she is assumed to know the answer; the tutor thus maintains her position as 'interpreter of the world' (Reynolds in Lather, 1991:59). Aspects of the latter element, pedagogy, have been problematised (see e.g. Thesen, 1997) but have not to date been explicitly linked to the former, theory. Yet these elements are interrelated and arise in part, I think, from **staying within a critique rather than a design conceptual space**. Kress usefully foregrounds a distinction between **critique** and design at an epistemological level in the follow- ing way: Design rests on a chain of processes of which critique ... is one: it **can** , however, **no longer be the focal** one, or be the major **goal** of textual prac- tices. Critique leaves the initial definition of the domain of analysis to the past, to past production. (Kress, 2000: 160) And he explicitly builds into this more creative force of epistemology- as-design the interests of actual designers, that is the users of language: 'Design shapes the future through deliberate deployment of representational resources in the designer's interest' (Kress, 1998: 77).

### A2: Consensus Bad

#### Maintaining game rules is not the type of consensus they critique

Tally ‘07

Tally, English – Texas State University, ‘7

(Robert T, “The Agony of the Political,” Post Modern Culture 17.2)

**Mouffe's image of a we/they politics** in which collective identities vie with one another for hegemony **looks a bit like organized sports**. Consider the football game: **rival sides squared off in a unambiguously agonistic struggle** for dominance**, with a clear winner and loser**, yet **agreeing to play by certain shared rules, and above all unwilling to destroy the sport itself** (i.e., the political association) **in order to achieve the side's particular goals**. Football **teams have no interest in dialogue, and the goal is not consensus**, **but victory**. The winner is triumphant, and the loser must regroup, practice, and try again later. **A clearly defined "we" will fight against the "they," but the aim is to win, not to destroy "them" or the sport itself**. But, noteworthy in the extended metaphor, some organizing body (rarely democratic) has established the rules and standards by which the sport is played. The players have no say in how the game is structured.¶ If the sports analogy seems too facile, consider Mouffe's own characterization. **Responding to** the "fundamental question for democratic theory" (i.e., **how to maintain antagonism in politics without destroying political association**), **Mouffe answers that it requires distinguishing between the categories of "antagonism" (relations between enemies) and "agonism" (relations between adversaries) and envisaging a sort of "conflictual consensus" providing a common symbolic space among opponents who are considered "legitimate enemies." Contrary to the dialogic approach, the democratic debate is conceived as a real confrontation.** Adversaries do fight--even fiercely--but according to a shared set of rules, and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, and accepted as legitimate perspectives. (52)¶ Play ball! Of course this means that, if the opposition party--oh, let's go ahead and call them the Reds--wishes to change the relations of power, it must do so within the political framework (e.g., legislative body or rules of the game). **To be outside of the framework is to not be playing the game at all.**¶A better model might be that of games on the playground. On the playground, children both organize and play games, often coming up with and changing the rules as they go along. Their **power relations are constantly adjusted, modified so as to make the game more fair** ("you get a head start"), **more safe** ("no hitting"), **more interesting** ("three points if you can make it from behind that line"), and so on. The overall structure of the game does not necessarily change, **but the specifics of how the game is played can vary**. This is not a utopian vision, obviously. The power relations on display at most playgrounds are not the most salutary. But t**his** model at least **provides an image of what a radical version of Mouffe's agonistic, democratic politics might look like**. How this would work outside the playground, in a global political context, is a different question. Can we get the world's diverse "teams" together on the same playground? Would a multipolar world system enable multiple grounds for playing? Who would or would not be allowed to play? Who would decide?¶ These practical questions are exceedingly tough to answer. **The agonistic model of politics requires an arena where contestants can hold competitions. It requires rules that may be altered but that also must be in place in order to know what game is being played**. And it requires a system that allows the sport to continue when particular games end. (That is, the winner cannot cancel further contests, a problem that has plagued nascent democracies.) A radical democracy founded on adversarial politics cannot simply replicate existing structures of liberal, parliamentary democracy. It must change the game.

#### Doesn’t link to their offense

Hatab ‘02

Hatab, Prof Philosophy – Old Dominion University, ‘2

(Lawrence J, “Prospects for a Democratic Agon,” Why we can still be Nietzscheans: The Journal of Nietzsche, Muse)

Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but **the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent**. **As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless**. So **I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest**. **And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contes**t. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants. 25 In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work.¶ Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). **Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing**, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. 26¶ **An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights, not as something "natural" possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal, procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice.** Constraints on speech, association, access, and so on, simply insure lopsided political contests. We can avoid metaphysical models of rights and construe them as simply social and political phenomena: social in the sense of entailing reciprocal recognition and obligation; political in the sense of being guaranteed and enforced by the state. **We can even defend so-called positive rights, such as a right to an adequate education, as requisite for fair competition in political discourse.**¶ **…Hatab Continues…**¶ Can there be more than a simply negative register in such a tragic conception? I think so. Just as, for Nietzsche, the tragic allows us to be sensitized and energized for the fragile meanings of existence, thus enhancing life, **a tragic politics could wean us from false comforts in foundations and open us to the urgent finite conditions of political life in an enhanced way. And even if one conceded the existence of foundational self-evident political principles**, would the force of such principles by themselves necessarily be able to prevent non-democratic outcomes? If not, the force of such principles [End Page 144] would be restricted to the solace of intellectual rectitude that can comfort theorists while the walls are coming down. The nonexistence of foundational guarantees surely does not prevent one from living and fighting for democratic ideals. What is to be said of someone who, in the absence of a guarantee, would hesitate to act or be obstructed from acting or see action as tainted or less than authentic? Nietzsche would take this as weakness. The most profound element in Nietzsche's conceptions of will to power, agonistics, and eternal recurrence, in my view, can be put in the following way. For Nietzsche, to act in the world is always to act in the midst of otherness, of resistances or obstacles. Hence to dream of action without otherness is to annul action. To affirm one's Other as necessarily constitutive of oneself is not only to affirm the full field of action (which is the sense of eternal recurrence), but also to affirm action as action, that is to say, a real move in life amidst real resistances, as opposed to the fantasy of self-sufficient, fully free, uncontested occurrences born in Western conceptions of divine perfection and continued in various philosophical models of demonstrative certainty and theoretical governance. The irony of a tragically open, agonistic politics is that it need not "infect" political life but in fact spur it toward the existential environment of it enactment. And as radically open, **an agonistic politics has the virtue of precluding the silencing of any voice, something especially important when even** **purportedly democratic dispositions are comfortable with exclusions (frustrated by citizens who will not come around to being impartial enough, rational enough, secular enough, deliberative enough, communal enough, virtuous enough, and so on), thereby becoming susceptible to the most ironic and insidious form of tyranny done in democracy's name.**

### Brown Ev

#### And, scientific and instrumental argumentation and research is key to motivate legislative fence-sitters. Their critical approach is just preaching to the choir which endangers public and decision-making backlashes which turn the case. Only our interp can generate the public debates necessary to ensure survival.

Brown 2k11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

### A2: Duffy

Duffy likes debate

Duffy 83

Duffy ’83 [Bernard, Rhetoric PhD – Pitt, Communication Prof – Cal Poly, “The Ethics of Argumentation in Intercollegiate Debate: A Conservative Appraisal,” National Forensics Journal, Spring, pp 65-71, accessed at <http://www.nationalforensics.org/journal/vol1no1-6.pdf>]

 I am not proposing that debaters only make arguments they believe in. Students also learn from articulating the principles which underlie positions they oppose.

Duffy is wrong - Switch side debate is good

Koehle 10

Joe Koehle, Phd candidate in communications at Kansas, former West Georgia debater

<http://mccfblog.org/actr/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Koehle_Paper_ACTR-editedPDF.pdf>.

 Much like criticism of the sophists has persisted throughout time; criticism of switch side debate has been a constant feature since the advent of tournament-style debating. Harrigan documents how numerous these criticisms have been in the last century, explaining that Page 15 Koehle 15 complaints about the mode of debate are as old as the activity itself (9). The most famous controversy over modern switch side debate occurred in 1954, when the U.S. military academies and the Nebraska teachers‟ colleges decided to boycott the resolution: “Resolved: That the United States should extend diplomatic relations to the communist government of China.” The schools that boycotted the topic argued that it was ethically and educationally indefensible to defend a recognition of communists, and even went so far as to argue that “a pro-recognition stand by men wearing the country‟s uniforms would lead to misunderstanding on the part of our friends and to distortion by our enemies” (English et al. 221). Switch side debate was on the defensive, and debate coaches of the time were engaged in virulent debate over the how to debate. The controversy made the national news when the journalist Edward Murrow became involved and opined on the issue in front of millions of TV viewers. English et al. even go so far as to credit the “debate about debate” with helping accelerate the implosion of the famous red- baiting Senator Joseph McCarthy (222). The debate about debate fell back out of the national spotlight after the high-profile incident over the China resolution, but it never ended in the debate community itself. The tenor of the debate reached a fever pitch when outright accusations of modern sophistry (the bad kind) were published in the Spring 1983 edition of the National Forensic Journal, when Bernard K. Duffy wrote, “The Ethics of Argumentation in Intercollegiate Debate: A Conservative Appraisal.” Echoing the old Platonic argument against sophistic practice, Duffy argued that switch side debate has ignored ethical considerations in the pursuit of teaching cheap techniques for victory (66). The 1990‟s saw a divergence of criticisms into two different camps. The first camp was comprised of traditional critics who argued that debate instruction and practice promoted form over substance. For example, a coach from Boston College lamented that absent a change,  “Debate instructors and their students will become the sophists of our age, susceptible to the traditional indictments elucidated by Isocrates and others” (Herbeck). Dale Bertelstein published a response to the previously cited article by Muir about switch side debate that launched into an extended discussion of debate and sophistry. This article continued the practice of coaches and communications scholars developing and applying the Platonic critique of the sophists to contemporary debate practices. Alongside this traditional criticism a newer set of critiques of switch side debate emerged. Armed with the language of Foucauldian criticism, Critical Legal Studies, and critiques of normativity and statism, many people who were uncomfortable with the debate tradition of arguing in favor of government action began to question the reason why one should ever be obliged to advocate government action. They began to argue that switch side debate was a mode of debate that unnecessarily constrained people to the hegemony of debating the given topic. These newer criticisms of switch side debate gained even more traction after the year 2000, with several skilled teams using these arguments to avoid having to debate one side of the topic. William Spanos, a professor of English at SUNY Binghamton decided to link the ethos of switch side debate to that of neo-conservatism after observing a debate tournament, saying that “the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush…learned their „disinterested‟ argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed.” (Spanos 467) Contemporary policy debate is now under attack from all sides, caught in its own dissoi logoi. Given the variety of assaults upon switch side debate by both sides of the political spectrum, how can switch side debate be justified? Supporters of switch side debate have made many arguments justifying the value of the practice that are not related to any defense of sophist Page 17 Koehle 17 techniques. I will only briefly describe them so as to not muddle the issue, but they are worthy of at least a cursory mention. The first defense is the most pragmatic reason of all: Mandating people debate both sides of a topic is most fair to participants because it helps mitigate the potential for a topic that is biased towards one side. More theoretical justifications are given, however. Supporters of switch side debate have argued that encouraging students to play the devil‟s advocate creates a sense of self-reflexivity that is crucial to promoting tolerance and preventing dogmatism (Muir 287). Others have attempted to justify switch side debate in educational terms and advocacy terms, explaining that it is a path to diversifying a student‟s knowledge by encouraging them to seek out paths they may have avoided otherwise, which in turn creates better public advocates (Dybvig and Iversen). In fact, contemporary policy debate and its reliance upon switching sides creates an oasis of argumentation free from the demands of advocacy, allowing students to test out ideas and become more well-rounded advocates as they leave the classroom and enter the polis (Coverstone). Finally, debate empowers individuals to become critical thinkers capable of making sound decisions (Mitchell, “Pedagogical Possibilities”, 41).

### State Key to solve

#### State action and coercion key to solve existential problems and turns corporate dominance

Mansbridge ’11

Jane is the Charles Adams Professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “On the Importance of Getting Things Done,” <http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPSC%2FPSC45_01%2FS104909651100165Xa.pdf&code=61d04501e14285b50244640216120c97>

T¶ rend plus inaction equals¶ drift. When a¶ trend has external causes¶ and no one can act to intervene, that inaction leads to¶ drift—the unimpeded trajectory of change. Drift in the¶ United States produces the¶ domination of American¶ democracy by business interests. Drift in international¶ decisions produces global¶ warming. Speciﬁc institutional designs for government, such as the US separation of¶ powers, can cause the inaction that facilitates drift. More fundamentally, ingrained patterns of thinking can cause inaction. Here¶ I argue that the long and multifaceted resistance tradition in the¶ West contributes to inaction by focusing on stopping, rather than¶ using, coercion.¶ By contrast, a political theory of democratic action explicitly¶ recognizes that solving collective action problems requires lawgiving, and that lawgiving requires coercion—getting people to¶ do what they would not otherwise do through the threat of sanction and the use of force. The work of democracy is to make that¶ coercion somewhat more legitimate. Thus, while a theory of democratic action should incorporate resistance, it should not—and¶ cannot—be driven by resistance.¶ In the United States and on the planet, we now face problems¶ vaster than any that James Madison conceived, involving interdependence on a global scale and potential catastrophe for unborn¶ generations. Serious attempts to deal with these problems continue to be stymied, in part by a view of democracy that is in many¶ of its strands a theory of individual and collective resistance, not a¶ theory of collective action.

### A2: Dialogue Means no Meaning

#### Dialogic meaning is still SOCIALLY grounded and thus FIXED

Lähteenmäki 4

Senior Researcher at University of Jyväskylä¶ <http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/140391690X%20-%20-%20Bakhtinian%20Perspectives%20on%20Language%20and%20Culture~%20Meaning%20in%20Language,%20Art%20and%20New%20.pdf>¶ Mika Lähteenmäki works as an Academy of Finland Postdoctoral¶ Researcher in the Department of Languages at the University of¶ Jyväskylä, Finland. His current research interests include the exegesis of¶ Bakhtin’s and Voloshinov’s works on language. He has written several¶ articles on the linguistic aspects of the works of Bakhtin and Voloshinov.

As the dialogical notion of meaning potential differs radically from the notion of literal meaning, it goes without saying that from the traditional, monologistic point of view **the notion of meaning potential may seem theoretically awkward**. **If meanings are not absolute**, invariant and identical for all the speakers, **it may seem that there is no way to make sense of the world** around us. The indeterminacy of meanings seems to lead to a situation in which there are as many possible meanings as there are situations. In other words, if one is not ready to accept the notion of literal meaning according to which there are absolute contextindependent meanings at the level of language system, **it may seem that the only alternative** **is to commit oneself to a relativistic ‘anything goes’ stance** according to which any expression can mean anything. **This** criticism, however, **can be seen as misguided**, since the basic assumption shared by Bakhtin, Voloshinov and Rommetveit is that the **meaning potential of a linguistic expression is inherently social** in its nature. The chief aim of this paper is to discuss the **dialogical** notion of **meaning** and to **argue against** **the view that** the notion of **meaning potential automatically implies a commitment to** an individualistic and **relativistic theory of meaning.** It is argued that the social nature of meaning potentials can be explicated by recontextualizing the **dialogical** approach to language and **communication** and considering it **from the viewpoint of ‘use-theory** of meaning’ **developed by Wittgenstein** in his Philosophical Investigations.2 The basic assumption is that meaning potentials are rooted in social practices of a given community and can be understood as properties that emerge from social activity. The main point is that, when interpreted within the framework of a ‘use-theory of meaning’, the **dialogical** notion of meaning potential can be given a definition which frees it from accusations of being relativistic, while, at the same time remaining, anti-essentialist and indeterministic in nature. To be more precise, **meaning potentials are** seen as being **emergent**3 by nature, which means they can be conceived of as **rules** which, on the one hand, function as resources for social and cultural practices and, on the other hand, are **(re)created via the actual rule-following behaviour.**

### A2: Reasonability

#### Reasonability is impossible – it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

Resnick ‘01

Resnick, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, ‘1

(Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing **a clear definition of terms is a precondition** for effective policymaking. **Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk** alienating their constituencies. They also risk **exacerbating misperceptions** and hostility among those the policies target. **Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research**. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

#### You aren’t reasonably topical- You don’t defend USFG action, this never makes any damn sense for why it matters.

#### Also irrelevant to our offense- If you destroy a stasis point or switch side debate we outweigh.

#### CI better:

#### A Predictable- Like a Disad clear offense outweighs.

#### B Prevents Judge intervention- No clear method means people intervene for what they want instead of what’s better for the community.

# 1NR

## Capitalism

### AT perm

#### only foregrounding materialism can adequately confront the real effects of ontologically and socially grounded racisms – the aff’s rejection of this materialism should itself be rejected.

WILLIAMS 2K5

[Christopher j., in defense of materialism: a critique of afrocentric ontology, PhD Candidate, Sociology, York university, institute of race relations, vol 47 1, Race and Class]

Debates about ontology are often regarded as purely academic, but, as¶ I have attempted to demonstrate, the connection between ontology,¶ paradigm formation and praxis has important consequences for life¶ beyond the ivory tower. Although there is almost nothing insightful¶ or revolutionary about the Afrocentric rejection of materialism, it is¶ profound in certain ways: profoundly untrue to the sociological concept¶ of life chances, which, in its non-bastardised form, is capable of¶ guiding critical social research; profoundly consonant with the dominant¶ view that critiques of capitalism are hopelessly wrongheaded; profoundly¶ sanguine in its assumption that far-reaching shifts in African-¶ American culture can occur while the broader structural context¶ remains unchanged; profoundly compatible with neo-conservative¶ platitudes about cultural pathology among African-Americans, and¶ so on. What is especially ironic is that some of the same people who¶ were involved in the concrete struggles of the 1960s now, as Afrocentric¶ scholars, struggle to be above the concrete, all in the name of distancing¶ their paradigm from materialism.¶ Given the harsh materiality of inadequate food, substandard¶ housing, underfunded schools, chronic unemployment, police truncheons¶ and bullets, inaccessible health care, prison cells, and so forth,¶ Afrocentricity will not speak fully to the lived experiences of people¶ of African descent until the ‘materialism and Afrocentricity do not¶ mix’ position is abandoned. Enforcing the putative purity of the paradigm¶ by espousing the view that consciousness determines being is¶ an effective boundary maintenance strategy; it keeps the materialist¶ demons at bay, but does little to challenge relations of dominance¶ structured along the axes of race, class and gender. Furthermore, the¶ impact of cultural struggle is bound to be negligible unless it occurs¶ in conjunction with struggles that are political, economic and, if necessary,¶ armed; this point has some strong affinities with Amilcar Cabral’s¶ position concerning the multiple modes of resistance that may be effectuated¶ by people working to challenge external domination.34 And,¶ finally, notwithstanding our opposition to many of the statements¶ put forth by Afrocentrists, we are in complete agreement with Ama¶ Mazama’s contention that ‘the ultimate test will be our praxis’.35 The¶ ability of this praxis to bring about a just society will be greatly¶ enhanced if the rejection of materialism is rejected.

#### AND, MATERIALIST EXPLANATIONS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED CAPITALIST RACISM THROUGH OBJECTIVE MEASUREMENTS LIKE “LIFE CHANCES” ARE EMPIRICALLY VERIFIED AND KEY TO GENERATE MATERIAL CHANGE - INDUCING ACTION THROUGH ARGUMENT. THEIR CONCIOUSNESS-BASED EXPLANATION ENDS UP BLAMING ABSTRACT GROUPS FOR “THINKING RACISM INTO EXISTENCE BECAUSE OF IRRATIONAL HATRED”. THAT JUSTIFIES THE STATUS QUO, NOT REVOLUTIONARY ACTION.

WILLIAMS 2K5

[Christopher j., in defense of materialism: a critique of afrocentric ontology, PhD Candidate, Sociology, York university, institute of race relations, vol 47 1, Race and Class]

The picture becomes even more confounding when concepts rooted¶ in materialist analyses of the social are appropriated and reinterpreted¶ within an idealist Afrocentric framework. The concept of life chances,¶ for example, has long been understood in unambiguously structural¶ terms by a number of leading sociologists. Weber, in his essay entitled¶ ‘Class, status, party’, wrote about life chances as indicative of classes;¶ that is, he considered people with similar life chances as the constituent¶ elements of a social class. In the course of building upon the work of¶ Weber, Ralph Dahrendorf, who has formulated the most thorough¶ sociological explication of life chances, explains that ‘life chances are¶ opportunities for individual growth, for the realization of talents,¶ wishes and hopes, and these opportunities are provided by social conditions’.¶ 7 Similarly, Peter M. Blau has demonstrated how life chances¶ are shaped by ascribed characteristics, occupational structures and¶ transformations at the level of macroeconomics.8 Perspectives on life¶ chances such as these have not only guided contemporary research¶ on structural violence under late capitalism, but also contain insights¶ that ought to be of interest to people of African descent, for the¶ power of racism is, in large measure, the power to truncate the life¶ chances of oppressed groups. The US black–white gap in life expectancy¶ is one of the more obvious manifestations of this phenomenon.¶ From an Afrocentric perspective, however, prevailing structural¶ arrangements and asymmetrical intergroup power relations are less¶ important determinants of life chances than individual consciousness.¶ As Harris explains:¶ While not anti-materialistic, an Afrocentric orientation is one which¶ asserts that consciousness determines being. Consciousness in this¶ sense means the way an individual (or a people) thinks about relationships¶ with self, others, with nature, and with some superior¶ idea or Being . . . For example, the ancient Egyptian assertion,¶ ‘Man Know Thy Self,’ indicates that the way one sees (thinks about¶ and conceptualizes) the world precedes and determines life chances¶ more so than exposure to or deprivation from various material¶ conditions.9¶ Presumably, then, if the life chances of African-Americans undergo a¶ sharp decline over the next two decades, this development will be the¶ consequence of an aggregate – and probably inexplicable – degradation¶ of consciousness rather than, say, the intensification of structural disadvantage.¶ § Marked 15:06 § Notwithstanding Harris’s disclaimer, this conception of¶ life chances is anti-materialistic: any other description stretches the limits of plausibility. The proposition that variations in life chances are reducible to variations in consciousness dovetails neatly with mainstream¶ pop psychology ‘mind over matter’ rhetoric, which has the¶ effect of discouraging critiques of the racial-economic status quo. To¶ wit: if being is determined by consciousness, then how reasonable is¶ it to put forth institutional racism as an explanation of the unacceptably¶ high levels of infant mortality among African-Americans? The¶ point is that, although it would be a mistake to contend that nonstructural¶ influences on life chances are non-existent, it is far more¶ egregious to sever the concept of life chances from the same materialist¶ ontology that gives it full meaning. Not to recognise this is to unwittingly¶ formulate a discourse of demobilisation rather than radicalisation.